Enclave oil development and the rearticulation of citizenship in Turkana, Kenya: Exploring ‘crude citizenship’

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Abstract
Turkana County, located in the arid region of northwestern Kenya, has long been imagined as backwards and unproductive. As a result, successive governments have neglected to provide adequate social services and investments in the county, leaving Turkanas to rely on humanitarian organizations for access to rights and protections traditionally associated with citizenship. Yet when oil was discovered in Turkana in 2012, the county was thrust into the international spotlight. The oil exploration and development activities that followed the oil discovery have already begun to impact life in Turkana. Accordingly, this paper focuses on changing social and political relationships in light of emergent spaces of enclave oil development in Turkana. Our analysis draws from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and field observations carried out in Kenya between October 2014 and May 2015. Specifically, we demonstrate that the Kenyan state’s historically hands-off approach to governing this region has led some Turkanas to seek recognition, legitimization, and fulfillment for their rights from oil companies, rather than the state. We argue that this is drawing oil companies and rural communities into an uneasy citizen-state-like relationship, altering the experiences and practices of citizenship in Turkana. We conclude that while the presence of oil companies in Turkana may benefit some, it also works to the detriment of others, introducing new forms of inequality and marginalization – a process we refer to as ‘crude citizenship’.

1. Introduction
In October 2014, protesters gathered outside the walls of a heavily secured oil camp in a remote part of Turkana, a rural county in northern Kenya. Protestors demanded that oil companies provide more job opportunities to Turkanas and distribute the benefits of oil development more widely throughout the county, where oil was discovered in 2012. Interestingly, the protestors directed their demands at oil companies rather than the national government, which has been accused of writing Turkana communities out of the national oil equation. In this paper, we examine how enclave oil development – namely, economic investment in resource-rich spaces with little or no economic benefit to wider society – is transforming relationships between rural communities, oil companies and the state in northern Kenya.

By examining evolving social and political relationships in Turkana’s emergent oil enclave, our analysis reveals that large-scale extractive development by foreign companies is altering relationships between key actors in the region. More specifically, we argue that enclave oil development is influencing how citizenship is experienced and practiced in Turkana. This paper contributes to existing scholarly literature that focuses on the diverse ways that rural communities in Africa understand, contest and engage with enclave development on or surrounding their lands (see Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Ferguson, 2005, 2006; Le Billon, 2004, 2005; MacEachern, 2010). Specifically, we aim to extend this literature by considering a situation in which enclave oil development is contributing to rearticulated forms of citizenship, as rural communities...

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This paper critically reflects on evolving relationships between rural communities, oil companies and the state in Turkana. In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that guides our analysis of social and political relationships in Turkana’s emergent resource enclave. This framework combines the notion of resource enclaves with theories from critical citizenship studies. We argue that, combined, these theories create a useful framework for examining how the practices of citizenship – namely, the way in which rights and duties are performed – are being influenced by the presence of extractive companies.

2. Theorising citizenship in resource enclaves

The fieldwork informing this paper was conducted in Kenya between October 2014 and March 2015. Qualitative data was collected through key informant interviews, focus groups and field observations. Key informant interviews were conducted with 16 development experts, including representatives of oil companies and international organisations. An additional 18 interviews were conducted with community experts in Turkana, including local government officials, civil society leaders and current and former employees of oil companies. We also conducted focus groups with women, youth and men (pastoralists) respectively in rural communities surrounding their operations. Participants were identified with the help of civil society organisations. This approach was intentionally non-random, as we targeted participants who had experience with or pertinent information on Turkana’s emergent oil industry. We also sought to account for people residing near extractive sites turn to companies to fulfil their economic and social needs. The case of Turkana contrasts with much of the existing research in this field of study, which has focused largely on cases of community resistance and conflict in response to the emergence of resource development enclaves.

By drawing attention to the experiences and practices of citizenship in and around resource enclaves, we also seek to reinvigorate politics in the study of natural resource development in Africa. This is important given that some of the more recent discourses on extractive industries in Kenya use language that downplays and depoliticises power-laden relationships between extractive companies and rural communities (Van Alstine and Barkemeyer, 2014). Within such discourses, community members residing in or near extractive sites are referred to as stakeholders or beneficiaries (Eweje, 2007). Such language is impartial and apolitical, overlooking complicated and shifting relationships between social groups and in and around sites of extraction. Our analysis takes the power-laden relationships between corporate actors and rural communities seriously, starting with the fact that private companies have emerged as competitors with the state for providing protection to citizens (Isin and Nyers, 2014). For this reason, we turn to the literature on critical citizenship studies in order to conceptualise relationships between rural communities, oil companies and the state in Turkana’s emergent resource development enclave. Beyond this specific case study however, we hope that this lens may be useful for studying social and political relationships in and around extractive operations in other parts of the continent, where resource extraction also unfolds in an enclaved manner.

The idea of enclave development can be traced back to studies on economies of agglomeration in the 1960s. The term represented the power-laden relationships between corporate actors and rural communities surrounding one particular site of oil exploration, bringing the total number of research participants to 134. Interview and focus group questions were open ended but focused on relationships between rural communities, oil companies and the state. Participants were identified with the help of civil society organisations. This approach was intentionally non-random, as we targeted participants who had experience with or pertinent information on Turkana’s emergent oil industry. We also sought to account for Agrawal and Gibson’s (1999) warning that rural communities should not be treated as homogenous, undifferentiated collectives, recognising that groups throughout Turkana may have different experiences with enclave oil development. To do so, we supplemented our own data with relevant data from other studies, including civil society reports, media reports and secondary literature. However, we recognise that this may be a limitation of our study given that research on community perspectives on oil in Turkana is only just beginning to occur.

This paper begins by proposing a theoretical framework for understanding the complicated relationships emerging between rural communities, oil companies and the state in Turkana, drawing from two bodies of literature: literature on resource enclaves and literature from critical citizenship studies. In this section, we clarify our use of the term ‘citizenship’. The next section of the paper provides an overview of the context of the study area, the history of oil exploration and development in the region and the emergence of a resource enclave in Turkana. Next, we analyse citizenship in Turkana, suggesting that the emergent oil enclave is influencing citizenship experiences and practices in the county. We argue that some Turkanas are seeking recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights from oil companies, and that such companies are (uneasily) resigning to the role of mediating rights in order to obtain social licenses to operate from rural communities surrounding their operations. However, the ability to make rights claims on oil companies is distributed unevenly across Turkana and is experienced differently by different groups in society. We refer to this process as ‘crude citizenship.’ We conclude by discussing how rural communities may redirect or refine crude citizenship in order to use enclaves as political spaces where their rights can be heard and recognised by companies and governments alike.

2.1. Natural resources and enclave development

While the idea of resource enclaves has been used to analyse diverse contexts around the globe – ranging from off-shore oil development in Africa (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012) to Chile’s mining industry (Phelps et al., 2015) – the common assumption is that enclaves are incapable of contributing to sustainable, local economic development in the long term. With the history and wide applicability of the concept in mind, we use James Ferguson’s work on enclaves in African contexts to better frame our analysis.

A seminal piece by Ferguson (2005), entitled Seeing Like an Oil Company, demonstrates how resource extraction occurs within secure enclaves in many parts of Africa. Drawing from Cardoso and Faletto’s (1969) notion of enclaves, Ferguson (2005) describes resource enclaves in contemporary Africa as characterised by expatriate corporate control over land and resources, high levels of securitisation and capital-intensive production in spite of high labour surpluses. He suggests that enclaves are used in part to secure capital investments in order to ensure that they remain out of the reach of actors (such as corrupt states) that are seen by investors as irresponsible, unpredictable or untrustworthy.

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geographical distribution of such enclaves throughout Africa, as well as the impact (or lack thereof) of enclaves on nearby communities (Le Billon, 2005; Ferguson, 2006; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Van Alstine, 2014). For example, MacEachern (2010) critically assessed his own positionality working and living within a resource enclave in southwestern Chad. His observations demonstrate that oil development in Chad appears typical of Ferguson’s (2005, 2006) framing of enclave resource development in Africa. MacEachern (2010: 349) explains that:

Participation in the project involved fieldwork in Cameroon and also in southern Chad, one of the poorest places on Earth, where the average life expectancy is about 47 years, infant mortality rates are approximately 10%, and other demographic indicators are similarly catastrophic. On the other hand, life inside the wire included Skippy peanut butter and Louisianan hot sauce brought in to stock the cafeterias, private air-conditioned trailers with hot showers and satellite television, and in Chad a posse of armed guards for any movement beyond the camp gates. Ferguson’s term “enclave” is perhaps too mild: this was life on a submarine.

In addition to affirming many of the characteristics attributed to resource enclaves across Africa, MacEachern’s (2010) work also reveals the extent to which such spaces are segregated from surrounding communities.

Much of the recent work on enclaves reacts against the notion that capitalism has spread evenly across the globe, producing ‘global homogenisation and standardisation’ in the process. Rather than seeing societies and economies around the world as subjected to the disciplines of capitalist globalisation (see Scott, 1999), this work has shown that capital investment in Africa remains uneven at best. Using resource extraction as an illustration, it argues that capital skips – rather than flows – from the global North to mineral-rich enclaves in the global South and then back to the global North again (Ferguson, 2005). In other words, the distribution of capital around the globe is not homogenous and its effects are not equal. Thus, while capital can be conceptualised as global in the sense that it moves around the world; it does not yet ‘encompass or cover contiguous geographic spaces’ (Ferguson, 2005: 279). As Ferguson argues, ‘capital does not “flow” from London to Cabinda [but rather] it hops, neatly skipping over most of what lies in between’ (2005: 379).

This point is particularly true in states that are ‘weak’ or have ‘collapsed’. However, even in so-called strong states, capital for the purpose of resource extraction tends to be ‘sharply walled off’ from the national population (Ferguson, 2005). Flexible state policies enable capital investments to bypass the state so that private firms can more efficiently exploit enclave, natural resource-rich patches. This suggests that the development of resource enclaves is fuelled by factors that are far more complicated than the interests of private capital alone.

Instead, research has shown that enclaves are shaped by negotiations between state and corporate actors, as well as broader political-economic trends (Palan, 2006; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Van Alstine et al., 2014; see also Phelps et al., 2015). Even though states enact certain policies in order to grow resource enclaves, the relationship between states and the companies that control resource extraction within enclaves is complex. As Palan (2006) explains, states readily sign contracts with oil companies that compromise their authority over enclaves while simultaneously denouncing corporate authority and bemoaning their loss of power and sovereignty. This reflects the complicated – even contradictory – nature of enclave development.

Yet, many states are willing and eager to negotiate responsibility and authority with companies, as powerful politicians and elites can derive significant economic benefits from extractive industries. Importantly, these benefits remain starkly disconnected from wider society (Ferguson, 2005: 378). Accordingly, resource enclaves often have ‘no immediate, significant and permanent positive impact’ on the communities that surround them (Llach et al., 2003: 13). This important point distinguishes resource enclaves from historic company towns, which traditionally contributed much more to national society through both capital investment and the employment of massive and regularised work forces (see Cardoso and Faletto, 1969; Ferguson, 2005). In contrast, research on resource enclaves suggests that they leave much less of a social and economic footprint in wider societies, as enclaves tend to be inserted into rural – often marginalised – communities with little intention of contributing to community needs (Le Billon, 2005; MacEachern, 2010; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Van Alstine et al., 2014).

2.2. The practices of citizenship

As many of the benefits produced by resource enclaves skip over nearby communities, enclaves themselves can act as reminders to community members about how they are overlooked within national development models (Ferguson, 2005). Thus, communities in and around resource enclaves are often involved in social and political struggles, as they demand access to benefits from the state in light of enclave development occurring near their homes or on land that historically belonged to them. In other words, resource enclaves can also create political spaces where the rights of surrounding community members – or citizens – are up for negotiation. For this reason, we find literature from critical citizenship studies useful for analysing the relationships between actors in and around resource development enclaves.

Before proceeding however, we wish to clarify how we understand the term citizenship. Traditionally, citizenship refers to a status bestowed on individuals that are considered members of a larger community (Marshall, 1950). For example, citizenship could be defined as membership with a nation-state. However, critical approaches to studying citizenship suggest that citizenship may be better understood as a practice or performance (Isin, 2009; Isin and Nyers, 2014; Nyers, 2006). We align ourselves with this approach to studying citizenship in Turkana, defining citizenship as ‘the “institution” mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014: 1). In this way, citizenship can be understood as processes by which subjects seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfilment for their rights.

We also hold that people occupy multiple political spaces and draw on multiple identities simultaneously. As Isin and Nyers explain ‘...the citizen of a polity almost never belongs only to that polity but to several nested, if not overlapping and conflicting, series of polities ranging from the city, region, the state, and the international’ (2014: 2). Similarly, as Robins et al. argue, citizens ‘...may act like citizens of the modern state in one context, and subjects of traditional authorities in another’ (2008: 1079). This point is important to highlight in the context of a globalising world where the state maintains formal sovereignty, yet other authoritative actors – including private companies – also participate in governance. This point is also important in light of our proceeding analysis, as community members often identify as Turkana first and foremost rather than as Kenyans (see McCabe, 1990, 1994).

2.3. Resource enclaves and the rearticulation of citizenship

As discussed above, resource enclaves can be understood as new political spaces that have been created by flexible and market-driven state policies that facilitate global flows in trade and investment. According to Ong, such spaces – characterised by the fluidity of markets and the mobility of both capital and
labour – ‘…radically challenge territorially based principles of citizenship’ (2006a: 122). This is because, within such spaces, actors beyond the state gain authority to recognise and legitimise certain rights (Isin and Nyers, 2014; Ong, 2006a).

Ong (2005) points to asylum seekers, refugee camps and cyber-space as examples of emergent political spaces where the rights and entitlements of citizenship have become disassociated or dis-articulated from the terrains of the state. For example, in refugee camps, a state may provide protection to non-citizens and refugees may look to claim their rights in a state other than their own. Furthermore, these claims are generally recognised and legitimised by intervening non-state actors, such as humanitarian organisations like the United Nations (UN) High Commission for Refugees. In this way, the processes by which refugees seek and attain recognition for their rights are not rooted within their own national territory. This is just one example of how dimensions of citizenship are less fixed than previously assumed, largely as a result of globalisation.

Perhaps surprisingly, we are not aware of any concerted efforts to connect the notion of resource enclaves with critical citizenship studies. Secured resource enclaves most certainly represent unique political spaces in which the ‘tidy seams’ between sovereignty, territory and citizenship come undone (Ong, 2005). As explained, resource enclaves have been brought into being by flexible state policies that direct foreign investment towards the efficient exploitation of resource-rich areas. While the state may retain formal sovereignty over resource enclaves, corporations exert de facto control over the administration, development and conditions of living and labouring within them. Enclaves therefore are – at the very least – co-governed by governmental and corporate authorities, representing ‘experimentation with governing and territorialisation in the interest of optimising wealth’ (Ong, 2008: 121).

With this in mind, the position that we take in this paper is that experimentation with governance for the purpose of resource development often influences how citizenship is experienced and practiced. Such effects are complicated by unique economic and ecological circumstances, as well as local social and political factors. For example, governance experiments for the sake of resource development in the Delta region of Nigeria and Cabinda in Angola have arguably had perverse effects on citizenship (Le Billon, 2001, 2004; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). In both cases, the growth of enclaves has motivated calls for secession, as citizens have reacted against the extraction of ‘local’ resources by ‘outsiders’. Calls for secession have altered local political identities through disassociation from the state, situating corporations as middlemen between local political leaders (or rebels) and central governments (Le Billon, 2001, 2004; McNamee, 2012).

In other cases, such as in Nigeria or Sudan, government fears of secession have resulted in the repression of rural communities near resource enclaves (Le Billon, 2001, 2004; McNamee, 2012). In such cases, states have used profits from enclave development to finance military operations to secure resource enclaves (Le Billon, 2001). While the state has maintained de facto control over these spaces, a complex network of public and private, global and local, security actors has been used to secure enclaves (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). Such violent repressions have come at a high cost for local communities, as the rule of law is placed above certain rights. For example, spaces for citizen action and democratic processes are limited (Le Billon, 2001).

It should also be noted that there are cases where resource enclaves have had little to no effect on how citizenship is experienced and practiced. For example, offshore oil extraction – a phenomenon that has been widely studied in Angola and Ghana – has proven to have very little impact on rural communities (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Ferguson, 2005; Le Billon, 2007). As offshore oil and gas production takes place in enclaves that are spatially distinct from other human activities, there are generally very few clear linkages to communities or local economies, which limits the impacts of this type of development on citizens (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012).

This brief literature review reveals just some of the ways that governance experiments with resource enclaves impact the experiences and practices of citizenship. With this in mind, we aim to extend this literature through the case of Turkana. We argue that in Turkana, some community members are beginning to look towards corporations for recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment of their rights as corporations gain authority to exert control over enclave spaces. This contrasts with much of the existing research in this field that has focused on community resistance and conflict in response to enclave development. Ultimately, our analysis demonstrates that the impacts of resource enclaves on citizenship are diverse and contingent upon unique, local relationships and material realities.

3. Background: A brief history of governance and citizenship in Turkana

3.1. Case study overview

The analysis in this paper is situated in the current context of Turkana, Kenya, a county located in the arid and semi-arid region of northwestern Kenya. The name of the county, ‘Turkana’, is borrowed from the name of the Turkana people, a Nilotic group that has called this region of Kenya home for centuries. Turkana encompasses 68,680 km² of land and has an estimated population of 855,399 people (GoK, 2014). It shares international borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda and is flanked by Lake Turkana to the east – the world’s largest permanent desert lake. Turkana is hot, dry and historically prone to droughts and famines. Despite these harsh conditions however, pastoralism has persisted as the main livelihood strategy in Turkana for centuries (Ellis and Swift, 1988; Lamphear, 1992) (see Fig. 1).

The persistence of pastoralism in Turkana is due in part to customary Turkana livelihood practices and land management systems, which preserve sources of pasture and water for use during droughts and dry seasons. For example, Turkanas make use of the region’s sparse resources by practicing a highly mobile form of pastoralism – accessing distant sources of pasture and water – and by keeping multiple species of livestock that consume different types of vegetation. Historically, Turkanas also hunted wild animals, foraged for wild fruits and nuts and even turned to low-input gardening during lean periods (Barrow, 1990; Oba, 1992; Schilling et al., 2012). However, such strategies are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in Turkana.

While customary Turkana livelihood practices and land management systems have become difficult to sustain in recent years, pastoralism remains the main livelihood strategy for 70% of the Turkana population (Watson and van Binsbergen, 2008). In addition to climate change, the effectiveness of customary Turkana livelihood practices and land management systems is being confounded by prolonged violent conflicts, protracted humanitarian interventions, and changing land use and tenure systems – the latter of which is being associated with oil exploration and development in various parts of Turkana (Eriksen and Lind, 2009). As a result of these combined factors, Turkana experiences some of the highest levels of poverty in Kenya, with 87.5% of people living below the poverty line and with illiteracy rates high as 93% (Demombynes and Kiringai, 2011; Eriksen and Lind, 2009; GoK, 2013).

The frequency of droughts in Turkana has increased from one drought every 10 years in the 1970s to nearly one drought every year in the early 2000s (Huho et al., 2011).
3.2. A brief history of governance and citizenship in Turkana

Since the earliest of colonial encounters in Turkana, the place has been imagined as backward and the customary practices of the Turkana have been perceived as unproductive and environmentally destructive (Eriksen and Lind, 2009). Colonial and post-colonial administrations alike have opted to play a minimal role in Turkana and have disproportionately allocated public resources to the high-output agricultural highlands in central and western Kenya (Eriksen and Lind, 2009). The colonial administration governed Turkana through a coercive and paternalistic system of indirect rule. Government interventions during the colonial era primarily involved punitive measures against Turkana resistance or initiatives meant to transition Turkanas away from pastoralism towards sedentary livelihoods, mainly wage labour (Eriksen and Lind, 2009; Lokuruka and Lokuruka, 2006). While post-colonial administrations have retained some of the policies and practices of their colonial predecessors, they have tended to bow away from the responsibilities that typically fall on governments.

Yet the historic absence of the state in Turkana is not simply a result of government agency; it is also an expression of Turkana agency. The historic role that Turkanas have played in resisting the presence of ‘foreign’ governments has been well documented elsewhere (see Collins, 2006; Lamphear, 1992; Lokuruka and Lokuruka, 2006; McCabe, 1994). SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT TURKANA RESISTANCE HAS INVOLVED BOTH MIGHTY AND NON-MIGHTY OPPOSITION TO MILITARY DOMINATION, THE ENFORCEMENT OF NEW POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND CHANGING LAND USE AND TENURE SYSTEMS, WHICH DATE BACK TO THE COLONIAL ERA. THIS FACTOR SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED AND HAS UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE MUTUAL DISSATISFACTION THAT Lingers IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKANAS AND THE STATE IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA. IN THIS WAY, THE STRATEGIC ABSENCE OF THE STATE IN TURKANA IS A CONSCIOUS RESPONSE TO THE TURKANAS UNWILLINGNESS TO BE GOVERNED AS PART OF KENYA. YET, THIS RESISTANCE HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE ENDURING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MARGINALISATION OF TURKANAS RELATIVE TO THE REST OF KENYAN SOCIETY.

Interestingly, the current government of Kenya has taken strides to fulfill some of its duties in the county, working to improve the provision of services in some areas. Despite this fact, Turkana still has among the lowest indicators in health, social services, infrastructure, education and skills training in the country (GoK, 2013). Most Turkanas continue to lack sufficient access to basic services and infrastructure and, by all accounts, violent conflict between Turkanas and neighbouring groups – made worse by a lack of public security – is on the rise (Agade, 2014; Schilling et al., 2012; Johannes et al., 2014). In most parts of Turkana, people spend multiple hours each day collecting water and often walk for days in order to receive the most basic of health services. Many also lack state-recognised identification or voter registration cards, which excludes them from decision-making processes that directly impact their lives.

Due to the ongoing political, social and economic marginalisation of Turkanas – and their reliance on a dwindling subsistence economy – many have been left with little choice but to rely on humanitarian organisations for their livelihoods, wellbeing and survival. International organisations have been providing social services and emergency relief in Turkana since the 1930s, beginning with Christian missionary organisations (McCabe,
Many Turkanas have come to rely on the presence of such organisations and to expect that they supplement or fulfill governance gaps. In many ways, the historical relationship between Turkanas and humanitarian organisations has been akin to that between citizens and states.

However, programmes implemented by humanitarian organisations frequently change and are sometimes phased out completely. When priorities change or funding dries up these organisations move on, leaving gaps in both service provision and local economies. This is evident in the recent case of the UN bowing out of Lokichoggio, a small town in northern Turkana. Colloquially referred to as ‘Loki’ within Kenya’s aid community, this town once served as a base for UN operations in South Sudan. In addition to serving as a base for humanitarian relief, the influx of UN and other personnel stimulated the local economy and supporting sector industries. Since the withdrawal of the UN in this region in the late 2000s, the once-buzzing Loki has come to be known as a ghost town. Business is essentially non-existent. People who used to be contracted or employed by the UN have lost their jobs. This has caused many people to move elsewhere in search of new opportunities, as well as access to basic social services that were once provided by humanitarian organisations.

As the presence and role of humanitarian organisations continues to change in Turkana, the Kenyan government is only just beginning (or attempting) to fill some of the corresponding governance gaps. However, this transition will take time and it is being further complicated by other changes, including the recent process of devolution in Kenya. The shifting priorities of humanitarian organisations, juxtaposed against the entrance of oil companies, as well as access to basic social services that were once contracted or employed by the UN have lost their jobs. This has caused many people to move elsewhere in search of new opportunities, as well as access to basic social services that were once provided by humanitarian organisations.

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4. Discussion

4.1. The history of oil exploration and development in Kenya

As the global importance of petroleum grew throughout the 20th century, oil companies sought out new frontiers for their exploration and development activities. Kenya can be seen as one of the latest frontiers for the oil industry, as commercially viable assets have only recently been discovered. However, the history of oil exploration in Kenya dates back to the 1950s, when Kenya was still under colonial rule. British Petroleum (BP) and Shell carried out early exploration work on the coast of Kenya beginning in 1954. Over the following decades, Exxon, Total, Chevron, Woodside and CNOOC followed. Between 1954 and 2011, a total of 33 wells were drilled in the country. While these wells revealed clear indications of hydrocarbons, none were deemed commercially viable.

After decades of unsuccessful exploration across Kenya, Anglo-Irish firm Tullow Oil announced that it had discovered oil in Kenya’s northwestern county of Turkana in 2012. Tullow Oil’s first discovery in Turkana occurred at Ngamia-1 well and was followed by another discovery at Twiga South-1 not long after. While exploration is still ongoing in order to determine the potential of these reserves, initial estimates suggest that the basin could have an excess of 600 million barrels of oil (Tullow, 2014).

Since the initial discovery, both Tullow Oil and Africa Oil have announced additional findings in Turkana. More oil companies have entered the region and exploration activities continue to expand and intensify across northern Kenya. In recent years, the Kenyan government has issued 46 licenses for oil exploration and production in the country, earning US $60 million (Kiragu, 2013). Kenya has quickly proven to be an attractive investment location. One elder from a small village at the foot of the Loima Hills summed up Turkana’s new position in the Kenyan economy in different terms, expressing a widespread sentiment in the county: ‘Turkana was forgotten in Kenya, but now that there is oil everywhere in our soil they are remembering us.’

4.2. The emergence of a resource enclave in Turkana

While oil companies have yet to move beyond the exploration stage in Turkana, it is already apparent that oil activities are unfolding in a ‘thoroughly enclaved manner’ (Ferguson, 2005: 278). In fact, Turkana represents an almost ideal type of resource enclave. To begin with, the oil industry has quickly and effectively created spaces of corporate control in Turkana. Like MacEachern (2010) explains of Chad, oil camps in Turkana are walled off from the harsh realities of life in surrounding rural communities. Workers live in highly secured gated compounds that are removed from surrounding towns and settlements. As a Turkana employee of one oil company stated: ‘Living in the camp is like a vacation. There is plenty of food, shelter and clothes. Pay is just pocket money.’ Workers come and go directly from company-leased airstrips to the compounds or the only hotel in the county with air-conditioning in SUV entourages. Both within and surrounding the compounds, company policies are enforced. For example, on the roads to and from the compounds, special speed limits are mandated and enforced by companies. Young Turkanas are also hired to keep grazing livestock away from roads and camps. Within such spaces, the governing authority of oil companies is obvious.

As a further demonstration of corporate control, oil sites in Turkana have been highly securitised by (quasi-)privatised security forces. Turkana has existing security challenges, including frequent violent inter-ethnic livestock raids and a high prevalence of illegal small arms (Agade, 2014). These matters are exacerbated by the fact that there is limited public security in the county, leaving Turkanas to rely on the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR), which are essentially armed civilian volunteers. In addition to having private security forces on-call in case of an emergency, oil companies have contracted members of the KPR to provide protection for company facilities. This rather innovative approach to ensuring security around oil sites through the hiring of civilian volunteers that have been armed by the state allows ‘operations to proceed without the added expense of securing and regulating an entire national space’ (Ferguson, 2006: 206).

Finally, the actual work of oil exploration and development is highly mechanised and reliant on small groups of highly skilled workers, satisfying the third criteria of resource enclaves. The people who are working within these spaces of corporate control are foreign workers and Kenyans with high levels of expertise and skills. Given that Turkanas have among the lowest literacy and education levels in Kenya, few are qualified for the limited employment opportunities that are available in this industry. As such, despite a high labour surplus in Turkana, the capital-intensive and mobile nature of the industry prevents oil companies from contributing to Turkana’s workforce in any significant manner. Thus, oil exploration and development in Turkana aligns with what Ferguson (2005) identifies as the new dominant model for oil extraction throughout oil states in Africa – namely, enclave oil development.

4.2.1. The resource enclave as an expression of state agency

It would be relatively easy to argue that the enclaved nature of oil activities in Turkana is a result of weak and underdeveloped state institutions. It is often suggested that issues of governance, corruption and transparency (or the lack thereof) explain why resource development offers little benefit to wider society in Africa. In fact, many have argued that the weak and unaccountable political formations that plague Africa are conducive to the creation and persistence of enclave development (Maconachie and Hilson, 2011; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; Wick and Bulte, 2009).
However, this approach to understanding enclave development appears too simplistic in the context of Turkana. Rather, our findings suggest that the Kenyan government has not been absent in the governance of oil, but has taken on an active role that facilitates capital investment rather than controls it. For example, in a study published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Patey (2014: 7) states:

International oil companies have received ample support from both former and current governments in Kenya. International oil companies are confident that the Kenyan government will not delay the start of oil production by stymying foreign investment with restrictive regulations.

In other words, the government has demonstrated a decidedly business-friendly attitude towards oil companies entering Kenya. This has included offering large tax exemptions, which attract foreign investment. The government has also taken a unique approach to contracting, which will result in low initial government profit shares (Patey, 2014). Companies appreciate this business-friendly attitude: As the CEO of Africa Oil, Keith Hill, recently stated, 'There are not many places left on earth where you can put together an acreage portfolio like this [Turkana] … Good contract terms, good support from the government – there are not that many happy hunting grounds left' (Hussain, 2013).

The government has also allowed oil companies and various other international stakeholders to both directly and indirectly influence the governance of oil in Kenya. Existing legislation and frameworks are long outdated. While the Petroleum Exploration Development and Production Bill 2014 provides clear provisions for local content on employment, the supply of goods and services and training Kenyan nationals, it has yet to be passed. In the absence of clear legislation, oil companies have been allowed to make many of their own decisions on these important issues. By dragging its feet in passing binding legislation (due to sizable challenges, such as the speed at which legislation can be developed and implemented versus the speed at which oil activities are unfolding), the government has permitted oil companies to exert de facto administrative control over the governance of oil in Turkana.

In summary, we find that Turkana's emergent resource enclave follows what Ferguson (2005) refers to as a 'low-overhead model'. Capital investments are facilitated by various state techniques, ranging from allowing oil companies to contract public reserves for security to providing favourable contract terms. As such, resource enclaves are not strictly a result of weak governance but rather, facilitated by state policies that enable private firms to more efficiently control and extract natural resources. In this sense, resource enclave can be seen as spaces where the state has chosen to be absent as a technology of governance. The state demonstrates its authority through its 'ability to provide contractual legal authority that can legitimate the extractive work of transnational firms' rather than by exercising control over national territories (Ferguson, 2005: 207). Thus, Turkana's emergent resource enclave is, at the very least, co-governed by governmental and corporate authorities and, at the most, primarily governed by private authorities (Ong, 2008). In either case, the emergence of a resource enclave is by design, occurring under the purview of the state.

4.3. The fulfillment of rights by oil companies

The hands-off approach of the government in Turkana's resource enclave has led companies to accept duties traditionally fulfilled by the state. In the words of one of the individuals we interviewed: 'there is no government presence in Turkana other than [traditional] chiefs and teachers. So communities look to companies. Companies fill tanks with water. They provide state services.' The presence of oil companies in Turkana is redefining institutions that mediate rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong (Isin and Nyers, 2014). In doing so, it is drawing rural communities and oil companies into uneasy citizen-state-like relationships. Through such relationships, Turkana increasingly seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfilment for their rights from oil companies operating near or on their land. In turn, oil companies are forced to make difficult decisions about whether and how to respond.

One clear example of oil companies taking on duties traditionally fulfilled by the state relates to the provision of social services and public goods. It is not unusual for extractive companies to contribute to social service provision through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. In fact, extractive companies are increasingly expected to develop robust CSR programmes when operating in Africa. Key informants report that the most common service being provided to communities by oil companies in Turkana is improved access to water. However, companies are also funding or directly providing communities with schools and education, hospitals and healthcare, and communication and road networks. This involvement exemplifies the relative absence of the state in Turkana, which leaves extractive companies responsible for 'the services and infrastructure that governments are responsible for but which have been neglected' (Macconachie and Hilson, 2013: 350). As companies deliver social services and public goods in order to fulfill the most basic of rights – such as the right to food, education and health and wellbeing – the line between the duties of the state and the duties of companies becomes blurred.

Another interesting example of rights fulfillment through service provision by oil companies in Turkana relates to the distribution of emergency food relief. It is estimated that in the wake of recent droughts, as much as 75% of Turkana’s population has been left reliant on food relief for survival (Constantaras, 2014). Oxfam, along with other humanitarian and religious organisations, have been distributing food relief in Turkana for over half a century (McCabe, 1990). However, key informants reported that as Oxfam has begun to shift its programmes away from the provision of basic and emergency services in Turkana, a gap in service provision has been created, which companies have stepped into fill. If access to ‘food aid is a reflection of . . . citizenship and belonging in a nation’ as Phillips argues, then the provision of food relief by companies is further illustrative of the citizen-state-like relationship emerging between Turkana oil companies and Turkana (2009: 37).

Finally, oil companies are also playing a role in providing protection to community members and in securing the lands they operate on against insecurity – a duty most commonly attributed to the state. Oil companies employ police reservists from rural communities for security purposes. However, they also contract private security companies to coordinate emergency logistics. Security services are primarily being used to protect oil companies and their employees, as well as to secure their interests and the surrounding areas. The use of such security technologies is further illustrative of how oil companies are taking on duties traditionally fulfilled by the state.

4.4. The practices of citizenship in Turkana’s resource enclave

As oil companies take on responsibilities that governments have historically been liable for, the experiences and practices of citizenship in Turkana becomes (further) complicated. New political spaces are emerging for Turkana to seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights. As Ong argues, when the
‘rights and protections long associated with citizenship [become] disarticulated from the state, they are re-articulated with elements such as market-based interests’ (2005: 697). In the case of Turkana, some rural communities are readily rearticulating their rights towards corporations, directing their claims towards the powerful, foreign oil companies controlling the spaces of enclave oil development.

For example, oil companies conduct large community consultations and meetings (barazas) before beginning their exploration activities. Turkana are effectively using barazas as spaces for seeking recognition and making demands on companies. Key informants discussed how communities have required oil companies to commit to installing water projects or other types of infrastructure before beginning exploration activities. Key informants also spoke of communities who insisted that companies hire and source goods locally, in order to contribute to local livelihoods, if they want to operate near surrounding communities. While barazas spoke of communities who insisted that companies hire and source goods locally, in order to contribute to local livelihoods, if they want to operate near surrounding communities. While barazas have always served as a space where communities meet with local governments to claim their rights, the fact that oil companies are now hosting barazas provides rural communities with a new mediating institution for claiming their rights, as well as more leverage for meeting their demands in return for access to their land.

Turkanas are also using company ‘field offices’ as spaces for seeking recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights. These offices, which tend to be located in small peri-urban centres in the general vicinity of oil sites, were established in order to facilitate community engagement. Key informants explained how Turkana – particularly community leaders – regularly visit these offices in order to ask questions, express their concerns, or seek benefits. Field office staff reported that they document concerns about the company’s unequal hiring practices, personal losses and damages and fears about pollution and its effect on livestock on a daily basis. Field office staff then report to their managers in order to determine how community complaints should be addressed. For example, following repeated complaints about livestock being hit by company vehicles, companies have begun a youth employment program to keep grazing livestock away from roads and camps and have decided on compensation packages for any losses. In essence, these field offices are non-state institutions that nonetheless serve as political spaces where Turkana can claim their rights as citizens.

While an interesting relationship is emerging between oil companies and communities, this relationship remains uneasy. The lack of government services and the long-term presence of humanitarian organisations – who continue to play a vital role in providing services – have perhaps contributed to the readiness of people in Turkana to accept the role of oil companies as authoritative, quasi-governmental actors. However, many companies are not particularly keen to find themselves in this relationship. As one industry representative relayed: ‘The whole idea of community donations, throwing trinkets over the fence, is not sustainable or positive … I cannot tell you how many dozens of schools and hospitals are now sitting empty.’ Representatives from different oil companies made it clear that as their primary accountability is to their shareholders, it is their goal to generate profit rather than play the role of government through service provision. However, given that generating profit often necessitates a positive relationship with surrounding communities, oil companies have uneasily resigned to the role of mediating rights and fulfilling certain duties.

### 4.5. Graduated citizenship in Turkana

While many Turkana are making use of enclave spaces to seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights, others have been disenfranchised from this process. These community members experience second-class citizenship, as both their rights are repeatedly denied or neglected by state and companies alike. The information, narratives, and observations that were shared with us during interviews and focus groups emphasise the point that the ability to make rights claims on oil companies is distributed unevenly across the county and is experienced differently by different groups within Turkana society.

In interviews and focus groups, some Turkana reported that the ability to benefit from oil companies was limited to members of society from certain socio-economic backgrounds. For example, most of the formal employment in the oil industry requires formal education and skills training – opportunities that are generally only afforded to wealthier Turkana or Kenyans from other parts of the country. The few that have been hired for management or other secure positions within oil camps reported that, in addition to a regular salary, they also experience added benefits of living securely behind the walls of oil camps and enjoying regular access to food, shelter, security and healthcare. Furthermore, highly skilled Turkana have access to professional development opportunities both in Kenya and abroad. For example, dozens of young Turkana have been sent to the United Kingdom to pursue oil-related post-graduate studies at some of the world’s most renowned universities. These individuals will graduate as part of an elite class of global professionals with world-class credentials (Ong, 2006a). A few other Turkana are successfully taking advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities created by companies, establishing businesses that could benefit from oil development over the coming decades. These knowledge-rich and enterprising subjects experience improved rights and freedoms as a result of oil exploration and development on their land (Ong, 2006b: 154).

Yet given that more than 80% of Turkana have not stepped foot inside a classroom, the vast majority of Turkana only qualify for work that is considered ‘unskilled’ within the oil industry. Unskilled work refers to manual labour – such as digging holes and trenches for men – and cleaning and cooking jobs, which are available for women. Yet unskilled work in the oil industry is insecure, short-term, and relatively low paying. These jobs lack the benefits that come with semi-skilled and skilled positions, such as access to health care and further training opportunities. Individuals that we spoke with in Turkana who had obtained unskilled work in the oil industry were grateful for the additional income that it brought into their households, but admitted that they could not count on these jobs in the future and that their overall livelihood situation had not improved as a result of such work.

Beyond socio-economic status, Turkana also reported that the ability to claim rights through oil companies was limited to community members from certain geographic locales. The interaction between communities and oil companies in Turkana is indeed territorialised: Relationships emerge wherever oil companies happen to be exploring or developing at a given time, which does not occur evenly throughout the county. Community members located within close proximity to exploration and development activities find themselves able to use emergent political spaces to advance their citizenship claims, unlike community members removed from oil sites.

For example, community members from a small village on the shores of Lake Turkana reported improved access to safe drinking water from an oil company in return for a social license to operate. This community had long been making similar claims from the state, which had gone unheeded. The oil company responded by funding a KSh 18 million (US $200,000) water project for the community. While this project has certainly contributed to meeting a basic right – access to water – for those residing within this particular community, those in more drought-prone regions of the county continue to suffer as they struggle to have this right realised.

Lastly, Turkana also explained how the ability to claim rights through oil companies was differentiated by local gender
norms and power inequalities. For example, elders and community leaders – most often men – participate in the barazas organised by oil companies. Consultants hired by oil companies to conduct barazas told us that they often enquire about women's perspectives but rarely engage with women directly. Perhaps for such reasons, our interviews and focus groups revealed that women (in comparison to men) often possess less accurate information and/or understanding of oil exploration and development. Women also reported that while men were effectively leveraging barazas to claim certain rights through oil companies in return for access to land, the demands being made did not always meet the most pressing needs of women and children.

Thus, the baraza approach to community consultation may perpetuate the marginalisation of women's voices in Turkana society, as women are not able to participate in civil society and politics to the same extent as men. This example effectively demonstrates how oil companies – knowingly or otherwise – perpetuate and/or exacerbate differentiated abilities of people to exercise their civil and political rights along gender lines. It also illustrates how oil companies mediate the state's duty to consult, but in a way that privileges men over women.

Ultimately, our interviews and focus groups support the argument that the emergence of a resource enclave in Turkana is contributing to graduated citizenship in Turkana; a process that we term ‘crude citizenship.’ Crude citizenship is defined by differences in peoples' ability to seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights as a result of the presence of new authoritative actors – such as oil companies – who influence the practices of citizenship. In the case of Turkana, we argue that the presence of oil companies is transforming the political terrain in a way that benefits some members of Turkana society while neglecting the rights and protections of others – mainly, individuals already belonging to marginalised groups.

4.6. Refining crude citizenship

While new political spaces have emerged for Turkanas to seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment of their rights as citizens, the geographic distribution of these spaces and who gets to participate is highly contingent and exclusive. As a result, some community members experience second-class citizenship, as oil companies view their rights claims as beyond the scope of their responsibility while the state continues to neglect their rights as well. This phenomenon confirms Ong's notion that rearticulating citizenship as a responsibility of market-based interests or corporate actors can result in 'diverse and contradictory standards of human worthiness' (2005: 699). This is precisely what we see unfolding in Turkana, where individuals who happen to be in the right place at the right time are positioned as worthy of protection and having their rights fulfilled, while others are left with little protection.

It is not altogether surprising that graduated forms of citizenship are emerging in Turkana with the development of a resource enclave. In principle, when citizenship is articulated towards the state, elected officials are expected to be attentive to their subjects' rights and aware of their own duties as governors (Arditi, 2007: 22). However, the same cannot be said of corporations that have been dragged into the processes of citizenship: Corporate actors are not responsible for representing the people of Turkana and Turkanas have not elected corporate actors as their representatives. Thus, it is understandable that corporations are not intent on ensuring that the rights of subjects are evenly experienced across Turkana, as they are guided – unlike governments – primarily by commitments to generate profits for their shareholders. Thus, an implicit consequence of enclave development appears to be the emergence of graduated citizenship, involving new stakes and consequences.

However, it also needs to be stressed that the implications of crude citizenship are not destined to be negative for everyone. The creation of new political spaces for communities to practice citizenship can be seen as a positive development. For many, the institution of citizenship has become a 'hopeless category that is complicit with the ongoing exclusions and exploitations of state and capitalist forms of power' (Isin and Nyers, 2014: 5). This has certainly been the case in Turkana, where the longstanding marginalisation of Turkanas has led many to believe that first-class citizenship is beyond reach. Yet, oil activities in Turkana may have the potential to address some of this pessimism. Because oil companies must be more attentive than the state to the rights claims of citizens if they are to avoid community resistance and, ultimately, gain profit, they have already begun to create spaces where Turkanas can be heard.

Making good use of these emergent spaces, however, requires civil society to engage in social struggle. As Isin and Nyers explain, 'struggle both precedes the conferment of rights and extends long after its recognition as legitimate by the polity and other citizens' (2014: 8). Effective social struggle in Turkana will require building local civil society capacity and local governance and creating a common ground upon which the authorities – state or company – can be pressured to address communities' demands. One member of Turkana civil society captured the importance of this process, saying, 'we need to organise ourselves before the multinationals organise us.'

It should be noted that civil society in Turkana is already mobilising and capitalising on opportunities for political dialogue and action in light of the new political spaces that have been created by oil exploration and development. For example, Friends of Lake Turkana (FoLT) – a grassroots organisation with a mission to foster social, economic and environmental justice in the Lake Turkana Basin – is campaigning for the rights of marginalised communities in Turkana who are threatened by both corporate and government-led resource development. The organisation is engaging with oil companies, as well as local and national governments, in order to mediate the rights-claims of communities near oil operations. Thus, there is potential for civil society to claim the Turkana's emergent resource enclave as a political space where their rights can be seen, heard and recognised. Yet, it also must be remembered that it is difficult to sustain social struggle in a marginalised and nomadic pastoralist society that is dispersed throughout the countryside and where funds to support such movements are scarce.

Another avenue for redefining or refining the potential negative implications of crude citizenship involves building the capacity of local government in Turkana. Currently, the local government of Turkana lacks the programmes, capabilities and resources required to effectively protect the rights of its polity in light of enclave oil development. However, local government has expressed its willingness to find new ways of 'doing government' in order to ensure that community members achieve recognition, legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights (Cordaid, 2015). If local government has the capacity to make use of emergent political spaces and mediate the rights claims of community members, it is more likely that Turkanas' rights will be seen, heard and recognised by both oil companies and the national government alike.

Importantly, the potential for Turkanas to refine crude citizenship – to stick with the metaphor – and to struggle for greater control over their rights in light of enclave oil development does remain contingent on broader trends. As a globally organised economy, the oil industry is heavily influenced by global and regional trends, such as commodity prices, labour availability and costs,
and technology development. The year 2015 has seen dramatic dips in oil prices – hitting $38.24 a barrel, the lowest in 6 years – and this has caused oil companies in Turkana to scale back, delay or abandon their operations (Karambu, 2015). Some companies have pulled out altogether. Therefore, whether Turkanas will be able to use enclave development to transform their status in Kenya remains to be seen, as do the long-term impacts that enclave development may have on the experiences and practices of citizenship in the county.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that enclave oil development is impacting social and political relationships in the county of Turkana in northern Kenya. Specifically, we have shown how the emergence of a resource enclave in Turkana is influencing the experiences and practices of citizenship. In light of the oil discovery, some Turkanas are rearticulating certain rights and entitlements associated with citizenship towards oil companies, rather than towards the state or humanitarian organisations. Our fieldwork suggests that this rearticulation of citizenship is altering the political terrain in Turkana in a manner that benefits only some members of society, while neglecting the rights and protections of others – a process we call ‘crude citizenship’.

Our use of the term crude citizenship serves three purposes: First, it captures the fact that community members in and around the oil enclave in Turkana are increasingly looking towards oil companies for recognition, legitimisation and fulfilment of their rights. Second, the term suggests that the experiences and practices of citizenship are evolving and remain uncertain in this particular region of the country, as Turkanas occupy a diversity of political spaces and draw on multiple identities simultaneously but still fail to have many of their rights claims heard. Lastly, the term hints at the potentially crass effects of enclave oil development on social and political relations. While new political spaces have emerged for Turkanas to seek recognition for their rights as citizens, these spaces are not equally accessible to all Turkanas as access is differentiated by geography, socio-economic status and gender.

This paper contributes several insights to the academic literature on the extractive industries and enclave development in contemporary Africa. First, it reaffirms that extractive development continues to unfold in a thoroughly enclaved manner. Next, complementing other recent studies focusing on enclave development (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Ferguson, 2005, 2006; MacEachern, 2010), our work illustrates another way in which rural communities in Africa understand, contest and engage with resource enclaves. However, given that Turkana represents an almost ideal type of resource enclave, we also underscore the fact that social and political relationships in and around Turkana’s oil enclave cannot be assumed to translate into other African contexts. Rather, our findings reinforce existing evidence that relationships around enclaves are complicated by unique, local realities. Finally, our work highlights the importance of ‘repoliticising’ analyses of the extractive industries and enclave development, particularly in African contexts. While some recent analyses have promoted extractive development in Africa as a technical, apolitical solution to poverty, we take seriously the way in which powerful corporate actors contribute to processes of social and political change when they enter rural communities. We also emphasise that there is a need to avoid overstating the long-term social, political and economic impacts of oil development, given the uncertain future of the industry.

Finally, our findings also highlight a number of interconnected areas for future work on resource development enclaves. First, our notion of crude citizenship requires further application, refining and development – assuming that it is received as a potentially useful analytical approach. Efforts to apply this lens to case studies in other geographical locations would be beneficial within and outside Africa, as well as across the global South and North. While scholars should remain sensitive to the dimensions of resource enclaves that are unique to the global South – such as the perpetuation of colonial style relationships between post-colonial states and powerful transnational companies – there are similarities between the South and North that could be examined more closely, particularly in terms of community–corporate relationships.

Our work also reveals a need to better understand the factors that shape how rural communities understand, contest and engage with resource enclaves. For example, why do Turkanas seem to understand resource enclaves as an opportunity to seek recognition, legitimisation and fulfilment of their rights (at this moment in time), while many other rural communities resist enclave development and challenge the presence and authority of corporations in such spaces? Because relationships between communities, companies and states in resource enclaves are diverse and complicated, there are countless opportunities to research the many ways that communities respond to enclave development. This would ultimately contribute to current understanding of how rural communities struggle to take advantage of, engage with or resist the privileged position that private authorities have been granted by some African states.

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